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Background. Contact tracing plays an important role in the control of emerging infectious diseases, but little is known yet
about its effectiveness. Here we deduce from a generic mathematical model how effectiveness of tracing relates to various
aspects of time, such as the course of individual infectivity, the (variability in) time between infection and symptom-based
detection, and delays in the tracing process. In addition, the possibility of iteratively tracing of yet asymptomatic infecteds is
considered. With these insights we explain why contact tracing was and will be effective for control of smallpox and SARS, only
partially effective for foot-and-mouth disease, and likely not effective for influenza. Methods and Findings. We investigate
contact tracing in a model of an emerging epidemic that is flexible enough to use for most infections. We consider isolation of
symptomatic infecteds as the basic scenario, and express effectiveness as the proportion of contacts that need to be traced for
a reproduction ratio smaller than 1. We obtain general results for special cases, which are interpreted with respect to the likely
success of tracing for influenza, smallpox, SARS, and foot-and-mouth disease epidemics. Conclusions. We conclude that (1)
there is no general predictive formula for the proportion to be traced as there is for the proportion to be vaccinated; (2)
variability in time to detection is favourable for effective tracing; (3) tracing effectiveness need not be sensitive to the duration
of the latent period and tracing delays; (4) iterative tracing primarily improves effectiveness when single-step tracing is on the
brink of being effective.
Citation: Klinkenberg D, Fraser C, Heesterbeek H (2006) The Effectiveness of Contact Tracing in Emerging Epidemics. PLoS ONE 1(1): e12. doi:10.1371/
journal.pone.0000012
INTRODUCTION
Control of epidemics of (emerging) infectious diseases, such as
SARS, pandemic influenza, or foot-and-mouth disease, always
faces the difficulty that some infectives are not yet observed. By
concentrating control measures only on observed cases (treatment,
isolation, culling), resources are used efficiently but control is often
not effective enough. On the other hand, by directing control to
the whole population (mass vaccination, prophylactic treatment,
preventive culling), epidemics are most likely contained, but at
high cost.
Contact tracing of symptomatic infecteds works on an in-
termediate level: treatment or quarantine of contactees (by contact
we mean the possible transmission event, by contactee the individual
that is contacted) may be effective because unidentified infecteds
are most likely to be found among contactees, and efficient
because the resources can be directed towards individuals at risk
only. Tracing and quarantine has been successfully applied for
smallpox control, where the term ‘Leicester method’ refers to
exactly this strategy, with the establishment of specific smallpox
hospitals [1]. It was also successful during the more recent SARS
epidemic [2], but not during the British foot-and-mouth epidemic
[3]. Here we wish to investigate how these differences can be
accounted for by the tracing process, thereby distinguishing
tracing and quarantine as having separate effects which can be
explained as follows.
Symptoms and detection divide the reproduction ratio R (the
average number of secondary infecteds per primary infected in
a susceptible population) into a part before detection and isolation
and a part after [4]:
R=R 0
pre+c( R 02R0
pre),
where c is the reduction factor due to isolation, R0 is the basic
reproduction ratio, when no efforts are made to isolate, and R0
pre is
that part of R0 occurring prior to detection. Contact tracing will
lead to earlier prevention of transmission due to quarantine of
traced infecteds, thereby reducing the uncontrolled transmission
R0
pre to R
pre, and the reproduction ratio R to Rq:
Rq=R
pre+c (R02R
pre).
The effect of decreasing R0
pre to R
pre is distinct from the effect of
isolation and quarantine which reduce c. For tracing to be
effective, Rq should be smaller than 1, so R
pre should be smaller
than (12c)/(12cR0), a threshold value determined by c and R0 [4–
6]. For comparison of contact tracing in different situations, we
will choose c=0 (as in [6–10]), because it is easy and as arbitrary as
any other value. The value c=0 is valid for foot-and-mouth
disease where traced herds are culled.
Several tracing studies have been published, some focussing on
specific infections [10,11] and some with the objective to obtain
more general insight, e.g. in a general Markov-type SIR model [7],
in a model incorporating symptom development [4], or in
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Different assumptions were made with regard to the possibility of
only tracing contacts of symptomatic infecteds (single-step tracing
[4,10,11]), or of iteratively tracing the contacts of traced infecteds
(iterative tracing [6–9]). However, no general insight has yet been
obtained in reducing R
pre in relation to time-related characteristics
of the infection and the tracing process, such as the latent and
infectious periods, the time of symptom-based detection, and
delays in the tracing process.
In this paper we consider detection and isolation as an autonomous
process most likely governed by detection via clinical symptoms.
This allows us to concentrate on contact tracing and quarantine, which
are initiated by this autonomous process. Also we only regard
transmission prior to control: we will consider tracing effective if
R
pre,1.
THE MODEL
We study an epidemic in its initial phase and use a branching
process for its description, which means that the epidemic can be
regarded as a growing tree. Each branch (contact) connects two
nodes (contactees) with a hierarchical relation, the infector having
infected the infectee. If one of the contactees is notified as being
infected, by becoming symptomatic or by being traced via
a secondary contact, the contact is traced with a probability pc
(all parameters and functions of the model are given in Table 1).
Each contact may be traced only once, either from infector to
infectee (forwards tracing) or from infectee to infector (backwards
tracing), so its traceability can be determined at the time of
transmission. Thus, infection trees with traceable and untraceable
contacts arise (Figure 1).
On these infection trees, two types of contact tracing are
distinguished. The first type is single-step contact tracing, in which
all traceable contactees of a symptomatic case are quarantined, but
tracing only continues when an undiscovered infected, quaran-
tined in this way, is detected itself (Figure 1A). The second type is
iterative tracing, in which tracing of traceable contactees is
continued, and a whole cluster of infecteds that is linked through
traceable contacts is quarantined (Figure 1B). Such continuation
would be possible if a test were available to determine the infection
status of traced contactees.
The underlying model for infection dynamics is based on the
framework of [4]. In our model, t measures time since infection of
an individual, which starts with a latent period until t=tlat
without transmission of the pathogen. During the infectious
period, lasting from tlat to tinf, infecteds give rise to b new infecteds
per unit of time, as long as they are not detected. As we are
interested in the effectiveness of tracing only, we do not model
possible transmission that might occur while being isolated, so
transmission ‘ceases’ after detection of the infected. This leaves us
with the basic reproduction ratio prior to detection, defined as the
Figure 1. Single-step and iterative tracing on an epidemic tree,
developing from left to right. Nodes are infecteds, lines are contacts,
contactees that were not infected are not represented on the tree. Grey
infecteds are asymptomatic, white infecteds are symptomatic, infecteds
with a thick border are isolated or quarantined. Solid lines are traceable
contacts, dotted lines are untraceable contacts. A. Single-step tracing. In
A1a-c, a symptomatic infected is isolated and his traceable contactees
are quarantined. In A2a-b (some time later), one of the quarantined
infecteds got symptomatic and his traceable contactees are quaran-
tined. B. Iterative tracing. In B1a-c, a symptomatic infected is isolated
and all infecteds directly or indirectly linked to this infected by traceable
contacts are quarantined. All quarantined infecteds form a traceable
cluster.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000012.g001
Table 1. List of most important parameters.
..................................................................................................................................................
parameter description
pc probability of a contact being traced
d duration of the time delay in each tracing step along the epidemic tree
R, Rq, R0 reproduction ratio: expected number of secondary infecteds produced by a single infected in a susceptible population; R0 is used in the absence
of control measures; Rq is with tracing and quarantine in effect
R0
pre pre-detection part of R0: expected number of secondary infecteds produced prior to symptom-based detection
t time since infection of an infected
tlat latent period: time between infection and the start of the infectious period
tinf time between infection and the end of the infectious period
a shape parameter of the detection time distribution (Gamma distribution). If a=1, the time to detection is exponentially distributed; if a=‘,i ti s
fixed
pc* critical tracing probability for which Rq=1
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0000012.t001
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 December 2006 | Issue 1 | e12expected number of secondary infections per infected in
a susceptible population before detection, R0
pre. Here we have
adjusted the interpretation of the model in [4], where R0 is divided
in an asymptomatic and a symptomatic part, by adding a detection
delay after becoming symptomatic. The part R0
pre is determined by
tlat, tinf, b, and the distribution of the detection time, a Gamma-
distribution with mean 1 (so time is measured relative to the mean
detection time) and shape parameter a. Throughout our analyses,
b will be scaled accordingly to achieve a desired value of R0
pre. This
model construction allows a flexible way of exploring different
assumptions about the time to detection, the infectious period, and
their overlap, and it enables us to evaluate tracing effectiveness for
most infections.
For full understanding of contact tracing in our model, we
analyzed four special cases regarding the infectious period and the
detection time distribution. The infectious period was assumed to
be either very short (all transmission occurs instantaneously, so
tinf=tlat) or very long (of infinite duration, so tinf=‘). (In our
model, infinite duration can be assumed because each infected will
stop spreading the infection after detection. If some infecteds
would never be detected, some large tinf,‘ should be taken.) The
detection time was assumed to be either fixed (a=‘) or highly
variable (a=1, i.e. exponentially distributed). As a control we
analyzed intermediate cases (results not shown) and four examples
of real infections (influenza, SARS, smallpox, and foot-and-mouth
disease), of which the parameter values are listed in Table 2. These
parameter values were obtained from literature [2,3,12–14],
assuming that the time to detection consists of the incubation
period (time to symptom onset) plus a symptom-to-detection delay,
which we assumed to be distributed as observed in the SARS
epidemic (average 3.67 days, [2]).
In our analyses tracing effectiveness will be expressed as the
critical tracing probability pc*, defined as the proportion of
contacts that need to be traced to achieve R
pre=1. If at least that
many contacts are traced, epidemics will certainly die out if
transmission during isolation or quarantine is prevented or limited
to a small number of health-care workers that do not re-introduce
the infection into the general community (see also [5]). If such re-
introductions cannot be excluded, a lower R
pre may be aimed for.
Because of this threshold of 1, the R0
pre values (without tracing)
were assumed to have some value larger than 1 (otherwise tracing
would not be needed at all) and less than published R0 values for
the specific cases (Table 2). First we study pc* as a function of R0
pre
and tlat (with tracing delay d=0), and second as a function of tlat
and d (with R0
pre=1.5).
RESULTS
Single-step tracing without delays
In an epidemic where single-step tracing is applied, asymptomatic
infecteds can spread the infection until they are detected and
isolated. Detected infecteds are asked to name their contactees,
and a proportion pc of all contactees will be reported and
quarantined. Only when quarantined infecteds are detected
themselves, tracing is continued (Figure 1A).
We determined the critical tracing probability pc* as a function
of the latent period for three values of R0
pre (1.5, 2, and 3). The
results are shown in Figure 2. If the detection time is fixed (a=‘),
a too large latent period (larger than the detection time) results in
a situation where every infected is detected before transmitting the
infection, so tracing need not prevent any transmission; hence the
maximum tlat of 1 in panels 2B and 2D. If we locate the
approximate position of real infections (parameter values in
Table 2) in Figure 2, we observe that the long infectious period will
be the best approximation for most infections, because we only
regard pre-detection transmission and infecteds will often still be
infectious at the time of detection. This does not entirely hold for
influenza, which therefore fits best between the short and long
infectious period. Because of the detection period distributions,
smallpox and FMD are best described by panel 2D, whereas
SARS and influenza fit best into panel 2C (influenza also into 2A).
In three special cases (panels 2A,B,D), with fixed incubation
period and/or short infectious period, the proportion of contacts
to be traced is at least 121/R0
pre. This lower limit 121/R0
pre is due
to forwards tracing, when all infecteds that are traceable via their
infector, are quarantined before the end of their latent period.
Then, the effective reproduction ratio will be equal to the
untraceable proportion of R0
pre, i.e. Rq=(12pc)R0
pre, resulting in
pc*=121/R0
pre. This is likely to be case with smallpox (panel 2D).
However, if the latent period is short, as seen for influenza and
possibly FMD, quarantine will occur too late to prevent all
infections and more contacts need to be traced.
In the fourth panel (2C), with variable detection time and long
infectious period, effective contact tracing requires a proportion of
contacts smaller than 121/R0
pre to be traced, if the latent period is
large enough (like SARS). This can be explained as follows. If the
detection time is variable and the latent and infectious periods are
large, many infecteds will be detected before becoming infectious.
If many infecteds are not infectious before being detected, the few
that are should be very infectious (‘‘superspreaders’’) to attain
a given R0
pre (the average number of secondary infections before
detection). Because many of the infectees of these superspreaders
Table 2. Parameter values for the real infections
..................................................................................................................................................
Infection R0
pre Detection time
1 Infectious period
2 References
mean variance at lat tinf
Influenza 1.5 1.48+3.67 0.22+11.3 2.43 0.097 0.971 [12,14]
SARS 1.5 3.81+3.67 8.34+11.3 2.94 0.668 3.61 [2]
Smallpox 3 15.5+3.67 4.08+11.3 24.9 0.781 1.35 [13]
FMD (82%)
3 1.6 7.8
3 2.03
3 30
3 0.33 ‘ [3]
FMD (18%)
3 14.9
3 6.12
3 4
3
1Sum of incubation period and time from symptom onset to detection as observed during the SARS epidemic [2]
2tlat and tinf are measured relative to the mean detection time
3The detection time distribution of FMD was modeled as a mixed Gamma distribution as in [3]
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0000012.t002
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 December 2006 | Issue 1 | e12will be detected early (variable detection time), the superspreaders
will be quarantined after backwards tracing, which adds to the
effect of forwards tracing preventing infectees to reach their
infectious period.
Effectiveness may be very sensitive to the latent period,
especially if there is little variation in the detection time. This is
most apparent in the sharp transition in panel 2B, where tracing is
only effective if all infectors are detected (at t=12tlat) before the
infectious period (at t=tlat), so tlat.0.5. The high sensitivity can
be a problem for assessing the tracing effectiveness for a specific
infection: the conclusion may largely depend on how correct the
available estimates for the latent and incubation periods are, the
incubation period determining the time to detection. Figure 2
indicates that this might be a problem for FMD.
Single-step tracing with delays
In the previous section tracing was an instantaneous process:
detection and isolation of a given case were followed by quarantine
of traceable contactees of that case without any delay. The effect of
a delay of duration d is that contactees of detected infecteds can
continue transmitting the infection for an extra d time units, unless
they are detected themselves during this interval.
The effect of a delay in each tracing step was studied by
determining the critical tracing probability pc* for R0
pre=1.5, as
a function of the latent period and tracing delay. Figure 3 shows
the resulting contour plots for the four special cases with single-
step tracing, and it indicates the approximate positions of the four
real infections. Along the tlat axis (d=0) lie the R0
pre=1.5 curves of
Figure 2.
It appears that the iso-pc* contours in Figure 3 are linear in three
of the four special cases (panel 3A,B,D), and approximately linear
in the fourth case, with long infectious period and variable
incubation time (panel 3C: tinf=‘; a=1). The slopes of all
(approximate) lines are always between 0.5 and 1.5. This means
that the effect of tracing delays is comparable to the sensitivity to
the latent period as observed in Figure 2, so plots of the critical
tracing probability as a function of the delay will resemble the plots
in Figure 2, only mirrored (as in Figure 4).
In the contour plots in Figure 3, tracing is ineffective in the dark
grey areas (small latent period or large delay), so smallpox and
SARS control are predicted to be able to cope with some delays,
whereas it might be more of a problem with FMD and influenza.
If forwards tracing is maximally effective and not affected by the
delay, pc*=121/R0
pre=0.33 as indicated by the light grey area
(smallpox if d,0.5). If the detection time is variable, tracing may
be effective even if a proportion less than 121/R0
pre is traced
(SARS if d,0.4, panel 3C). Because backwards tracing is needed
to attain this result, it is only possible when the tracing delay is
shorter than the infectious period (not shown in the Figures).
The contour plots show that for some combinations of latent
period and delay, the sensitivity to small changes in the delay is
large (contours lie close to one another). Then, small changes in
the delay can have a major impact when the time of quarantine is
shifted from just before to just after the end of the latent period,
similar to the sensitivity to tlat as observed in Figure 2. This effect
is most dramatic if there is little variation in the detection time
(smallpox: d<0.7, and FMD: d<0.2).
Figure 4 shows the effectiveness of single-step tracing for SARS,
smallpox, influenza, and FMD using the parameter values listed in
Figure 2. The effectiveness of single-step contact tracing without tracing delays. Effectiveness is expressed as the minimum proportion of contacts
that need to be traced for effective control (critical tracing probability pc*). The plots show pc* as a function of the latent period relative to the mean
time to detection (tlat). There are four special cases: A. Short infectious period and variable time to detection; B. Short infectious period and fixed
detection time; C. Long infectious period and variable time to detection; and D. Long infectious period and fixed detection time. The three curves
denote pc* for different values of the pre-isolation reproduction ratio R0
pre. Indicated by dashed lines are the average tlat for four infections, in the
panels with closest correspondence to the actual parameter values (Table 2). Influenza appears in two panels with long and short infectious period,
because it corresponds to both parameter sets equally.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000012.g002
The Effectiveness of Tracing
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 December 2006 | Issue 1 | e12Figure 3. The effectiveness of single-step contact tracing with tracing delays, with the pre-detection reproduction ratio R0
pre=1.5. Effectiveness is
expressed as the minimum proportion of contacts that need to be traced for effective control (critical tracing probability pc*). The contour plots show
pc* as a function of the tracing delay d and the latent period tlat, measured relative to the mean detection time, for four special cases: A. Short
infectious period and variable incubation period; B. Short infectious period and fixed incubation period; C. Long infectious period and variable
incubation period; and D. Long infectious period and fixed incubation period. Dark grey shadows indicate areas where tracing is ineffective, light grey
shadows indicate areas where pc*=0.33. Indicated by dashed lines are the average tlat for four infections, in the panels with closest correspondence
to the actual parameter values (Table 2). Influenza appears in two panels with long and short infectious period, because it corresponds to both
parameter sets equally.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000012.g003
Figure 4. The effectiveness of single-step and iterative contact tracing for control of influenza, smallpox, SARS, and foot-and-mouth disease.
Effectiveness is expressed as the minimum proportion of contacts that need to be traced for effective control (critical tracing probability pc*); pc*i s
plotted as a function of the relative delay (d, proportion of the incubation period) or the absolute delay (days).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000012.g004
The Effectiveness of Tracing
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 December 2006 | Issue 1 | e12Table 2. Panel 4A shows the relation between pc* and the relative
tracing delay d, from which it appears that the general cases shown
in Figures 2 and 3 are good predictors for assessing tracing
effectiveness. Influenza can be placed somewhere between long
and short infectious periods (panels 2A,C, and 3A,C): it is hardly
effective without delay, and ineffective already if d=0.1. SARS
control requires a tracing probability pc*,121/R0
pre which is
relatively insensitive to delays. Smallpox requires pc*=121/R0
pre,
and is insensitive to delays up to some point (d<0.6) where tracing
becomes quickly ineffective. Finally, FMD can be traced effectively
only if d is small, but it is sensitive to delays already if d is small and
requires a tracing probability pc*.121/R0
pre. Measured in real
time (panel 4B), effectiveness of tracing appears to be highly
dependent on the actual generation time of the infection. Influenza
control is hardly possible, FMD control will be difficult, whereas
tracing is likely to be successful for smallpox and SARS.
Iterative tracing
Suppose a test is available to determine the infection status of
traced contactees. We can then continue tracing iteratively before
infected contactees are detected due to symptoms, until no further
infecteds are found (Figure 1B).
We evaluated iterative tracing with and without delays for the
same cases as single-step tracing, resulting in Figures similar to
Figures 2 and 3 (see Supporting Information). As expected, the
universal effect of iterative tracing is to lower pc*, although the
lower limits 121/R0
pre as observed in three of the four special cases
remain intact. The largest difference between single-step and
iterative tracing is observed when single-step tracing is on the
brink of being effective, so that is the only situation where iterative
tracing will make a difference (see also Figure 4). Without delays
this difference is rather intuitive: single-step tracing is not effective
if the latent period is small, but iterative tracing will always be
effective, because if all contacts are traceable, the first detection is
immediately followed by quarantine of every infected. This is the
case with influenza, although the improvement will probably not
be sufficient to making tracing effective for influenza control. On
the other hand, when the latent period is large and single-step
tracing is effective, iterative tracing only improves on this if there
are significant delays, providing one or two more days to reach the
required pc* (smallpox, SARS, and FMD).
DISCUSSION
We studied the effectiveness of contact tracing in a model for the
start of an epidemic, that is flexible enough to use for most
infections. Effectiveness of contact tracing was expressed as the
minimum proportion of contacts that need to be traced to obtain
a reproduction ratio prior to control of 1 (pc*). Other threshold
values may be chosen if more is known about transmission of the
infection to the general community while infectious individuals are
being isolated or quarantined. For instance, if isolated infecteds
still cause an average of 0.3 new cases in the general community
after isolation or quarantine, pc* should be redefined such that
R
pre=0.7.
The first conclusion from our model is that, for a given R0
pre, the
critical tracing probability can take any value depending on all
infectious disease characteristics in the model: the latent period,
the infectious period, and the detection time distribution. In
contrast to some earlier publications on contact tracing [7,9], there
exists no general expression for pc* as there is for the proportion to
vaccinate for effective control in a well-mixed population. For
smallpox the relation pc*=121/R0
pre holds reasonably well, but
for SARS it is smaller, and for influenza and FMD it is larger.
The second conclusion is that a variable detection time
improves tracing effectiveness, possibly even resulting in
pc*,121/R0
pre. This does not mean, of course, that one should
aim at late detection of some infecteds (which would increase
R0
pre), but that apparent variability is an argument to use tracing.
The reason is that the few infecteds that are detected late (or not at
all, which is essentially the same) will be discovered by backwards
tracing which is an additional effect to forwards tracing that in
itself may already result in pc*=121/R0
pre. It was earlier found
that pc* can be smaller than 121/R0
pre [9], but by a different
mechanism, namely the presence of shared contacts in a network.
The third conclusion is that the sensitivity of tracing
effectiveness to the latent period and tracing delay may be large,
especially in the case of single-step tracing. If this is the case
already with a small delay (influenza and to a lesser extent FMD),
reliability of parameter estimates will be crucial to establish
whether tracing is advantageous. If it is only the case with larger
delays (smallpox, SARS), tracing may be effective as long as it is
done quick enough.
The fourth conclusion is that in most situations single-step and
iterative tracing are almost equally effective. A considerable
difference can only be expected if single-step tracing is not or
hardly effective, which is also when the sensitivity to the latent
period and tracing delay is largest (see above). Thus, influenza
control will benefit from iterative tracing already without delays,
whereas with the other infections one or two days may be gained
(Figure 4C,D), thus having more time to achieve the required pc*.
In the real world, the choice between single-step and iterative
tracing will be based on what is possible. Capacity problems may
reduce the effectiveness of iterative tracing if effort is directed
towards secondary contactees prior to primary contactees; on the
other hand, if not quarantine but vaccination is applied, it might
be worthwhile to traced contactees of contactees even without
diagnostic tests [6].
For determining the cost-effectiveness of contact tracing, not
only the critical tracing probability pc* is required, but also how
easily that pc* can be achieved. A key aspect will be the possibility
to distinguish relevant contacts: for control of sexually transmitted
diseases relevant contacts are easily identified (that is, if people are
willing to co-operate), but in case of respiratory pathogens like
SARS or influenza the notion of relevant contacts is rather diffuse.
Good insight will be obtained by not only regarding the sensitivity
of tracing (pc), but also the positive predictive value: what proportion of
traced individuals is actually infected, and if we put more effort
into increasing pc, how will it decrease the positive predictive
value?
A relatively easy way to increase the proportion of traced
contacts for respiratory pathogens like influenza might be
quarantine of households. This can be effective if households are
the prime location for spread of the infection; specific models
taking into account the contact structures within and between
households will be better-suited to study this strategy.
In our model we only regarded transmission of the infection
before tracing or isolation, allowing us to focus on the
characteristics of the contact tracing itself. Regarding the control
of animal disease epidemics, e.g. foot-and-mouth disease or avian
influenza, it is not unreasonable to assume that there will be no
other transmission: all infected and suspected farms will be culled
and they really will stop being infectious. However, with human
infections it is very likely that isolation and quarantine will be less
effective. This results in a complicated situation, because trans-
mission will not only be reduced after detection, the contact
structure will also change, with only a limited number of people
(health-care workers) having contact with multiple isolated
The Effectiveness of Tracing
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 December 2006 | Issue 1 | e12patients. For the case of SARS, a more detailed model on exactly
this aspect was studied by Lloyd-Smith et al [5], who indeed
concluded that minimizing within-hospital transmission might be
crucial, especially if tracing and isolation occur rather slowly.
Further studies are required for this complex problem. The
present paper provides a good understanding of the principles of
contact tracing, and how infectious disease characteristics de-
termine the effectiveness.
METHODS
The effect of single-step tracing can be measured by the effective
reproduction ratio Rq, the average number of new infections per
infected. Whereas the rate of being traced backwards at time t
since infection (due to detection of any infectee) is equal for all
infecteds, the rate of being traced forwards (due to detection of the
infector) depends on the generation-time distribution, which in
turn depends on the number of traceable generations backwards in
the transmission tree (traceable ancestors). Hence, infectives need
to be typed according to the number of traceable ancestors j, and
Rq is the largest eigenvalue of the next-generation matrix K with
entries kij being the expected number of type-i infecteds (with i
traceable ancestors) produced per type-j infected [15]. Because
type-j infecteds only produce type-0 and type-j+1 infecteds, by
untraceable and traceable contacts respectively, all entries other
than k0j and kj+1,j are equal to 0.
Even though the matrix is infinitely large, we conjecture from all
observed numerical calculations that the positive elements kj+1,j
converge in the sense that |kj+1,j2kj+2,j+1|R0a sjR‘. Therefore,
for numerical evaluation we ‘closed’ the matrix to an (n+1)
2 matrix
with knn=kn+1,n. For the four special cases, Rq could be calculated
numerically in MathematicaH, but for other cases considered, the
entries of the matrix had to be determined by numerical
simulation. Analysis of single-step tracing with delay could be
done by calculating R from the next-generation matrix, as for the
model without delay (see Supporting Information for all details).
With iterative tracing, isolation of a single infected results in
quarantine of a cluster of infecteds, all mutually linked by traceable
contacts (Figure 1B). By recognizing these clusters of infectives, an
epidemic of infected individuals can be regarded as an epidemic of
traceable clusters. Each untraceable contact in the transmission
tree results in infection of a new cluster index case, so the average
number of untraceable contact infections caused by a single
cluster, the cluster reproduction ratio Rc, determines the
effectiveness of iterative contact tracing. If Y(pc) denotes the
expected cumulative infectiousness of a cluster at the time of
cluster quarantine, then
RC ~ 1 {pC ðÞ Yp c ðÞ ð 1Þ
As with single-step tracing, effectiveness of iterative tracing is
determined by considering the critical tracing probability (for
achieving Rc=1):
p 
C ~ 1 { 1
Yp  
c
 ð2Þ
If pc=0, then each infective will be a separate cluster, and
Rc=Y(0)=R0
pre by definition. For pc.0 the cluster size will be
larger than one, but cluster infectiousness need not be larger, as
backwards tracing can reduce the infectious period of super-
spreaders with large detection time as it does in single-step tracing.
For two of the four special cases (a=‘), and for the case
considered by Mu ¨ller et al [7] (a=1,tinf=‘, tlat=0), Y(pc) can be
calculated numerically in MathematicaH. For all other cases,
including the real infections, stochastic simulations were needed.
Incorporating delays into iterative tracing does not generally
change the concept of Rc, but it makes the calculation of Y(pc) very
complicated, because there is no longer a single time of cluster
quarantine. Two complications arise: first, delays may cause
contactees in the chain emanating from a symptomatic infected to
become symptomatic themselves before the tracing process
reaches them. They then initiate a new tracing process of their
own within the same cluster. Second, if the infection process is
faster than the tracing process, the cluster size grows infinitely
large and iterative tracing becomes ineffective. We determined pc*
by stochastic simulation of clusters until quarantine of the final
infected (see Supporting Information for all details).
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